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Relative Militarization and its Impact on Public Policy:
Budgetary Shifts in Argentina, 1963-1982
ABSTRACT
In spite of a growing literature on the subject, analyses of the policy
impact of military regimes in Latin America remain inconclusive. Empirical
analyses have neither confirmed or denied the proposition that military regimes
have a decided, and often negative impact on public policy. In light of that,
this essay attempts to test the relatively simple assumption that it is the
degree of military control over the state apparatus (i.e. the relative "depth"
of militarization) , rather than the advent of a military-bureaucratic regime per
se , that has the most influence on public policy outputs, here measured in
budgetary allocations at both the macroeconomic and microeconomic levels. To
accomplish this, we examine central administrative expenditures under the
military-bureaucratic regimes that governed Argentina from 1966 to 1973 and 1976
to 1983, and compare them with those of the civilian elected regimes that each
displaced. In addition, we examine budgetary allocations to "core" areas of
state activity—-national health and labor administration—-in order to determine
whether there are significant policy differences at this level as well. Using
this hybrid model, we conclude that, certain contradictions and variances
notwithstanding, what is intuitively obvious is confirmed: there is a positive
correlation between the "depth" of militarization and budgetary shifts at both
levels.
Relative Militarization and its Impact on Public Policy
Budgetary Shifts in Argentina, 1963-1982
I. Introduction
At a theoretical level, the debate over the policy impact of Latin American
militarism, and bureaucratic authoritarianism in particular, has essentially
concluded. Despite normative differences (such as those between desarrollistas
and dependendistas ) , most analysts now accept the validxty of what was long
believed to be intuitively obvious: military regimes do have an impact on public
policy in Latin America, although on an aggregate level this impact is relative-
ly weak and distributed differently among specific policy areas. (1) This
difference is most apparent with regard to political, regulatory, and symbolic
policy, particularly as they are expressed in approaches to civil and political
rights. By definition, the advent of a military regime entails a drastic
restructuring—and narrowing— of the rules of the political "game." However, in
spite of a growing literature on the subject, the evidence with regard to social
and economic policy remains inconclusive. While it is generally accepted that
in absolute terms military regimes are more prone that civilian regimes to
direct public resources towards defense-related concerns (which are often
broadly defined, depending on historical and contextual factors), the evidence
with regard to overall expenditure levels and the specific amount of resources
directed towards other areas of state activity is incomplete and mixed at best.
Budgetary analysis remains contradictory: some military regimes spend more on
social services and economic development than do some civilian regimes, while
others do not. Differences also exist between the spending patterns of military
regimes. (Remitter, 1978; Most, 1980; Grindle, 1987; Sloan, 1986; Hughes and
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regimes. (Remmer, 1978; Most, 1980; Grindle, 1987; Sloan, 1986; Hughes and
Mijeski, 1984; Hartlyn and Morley, 1986; Looney and Frederikson, 1987). More-
over, the (over) expansion of the state and policy variation in Latin America
has been seen as stemming from a form of bureaucratic irrationality based on the
political and material insecurities of state managers who are confronted by a
wide array of uncertainties at both levels (which in turn derive from the
instabilities and uncertainties inherent in the surrounding political environ-
ment) * Continued bureaucratic expansion in the interest of self-preservation
and other organizational pathologies are believed to cross all regime types and
national boundaries, and intefere with efficient policy-implementation in each
case (Sloan, 1981). "Structural overbureaucratization" and "behavioral under-
bureaucratization" are believed to conspire against policy implementation under
all regimes, and lie at the root of policy shifts and state inefficiency
throughout the region (Schmitter, 1971, cited in Sloan, 1981). Likewise, all
regimes in Latin America, civilian and military alike, are subject to the
constraints imposed by their insertion in the regional and global economic
systems. In effect, "socioeconomic conditions impose such basic constraints on
political actors that it makes little difference whether they are civilian or
military." (Remmer, 1978; p. 44) Even so, the underlieing question remains.
Since political criteria ultimately determine the content of public policy, does
not the advent of a military regime signify major shifts in public policy that
are evident in budgetary allocations to specific areas of state activity such as
the economic management, social services, and interest group administration
branches? What is intuitively obvious as of yet lacks empirical confirmation.
As the most modern form of Latin American militarism, bureaucratic authori-
tarian (BA) regimes are believed to adopt technocratic, efficiency-oriented, and
developmentalist approaches towards the formulation and implementation of public
policy (O'Donnell, 1973; O'Donnell and Oszlak, 1976; Collier, 1979; O'Donnell,
1978; Oszlak, 1980; Merkx and Remmer, 1982). Within the state apparatus, BA
regimes adopt pyramidal organizational hierarchies characterized by parallel
(most often military) control lines. They undertake a program of rationaliza-
tion, de-concentration, and subsidarization of functional responsibilities,
coupled with an efficiency-based management style (Oszlak and O'Donnell, 1976;
Oszlak, 1977; Oszlak, 1980). Financially, BA regimes employ universalistic
budgetary schemes governed by authoritarian (noncompetitive) allocation pro-
cedures. At the personnel level, there is often a "colonization" of the state
apparatus by active or retired military personnel (Oszlak, 1980; Rouquie, 1982).
It is believed that the exclusionary (when not repressive) features of these
regimes are not only evident in non-allocative areas such as regulatory and
symbolic policy, but also in social policy, where the technical justification
for the de-emphasis on providing certain types of public goods is attributed to
the need for bureaucratic rationalization in areas that had traditionally been
sources of waste and inefficiency, something that is believed to have been taken
to new extremes by the preceeding civilian regimes (Oszlak, 1980; Canitrot,
1980; Canitrot, 1981). The empirical evidence, however, continues to defy the
argument that these regimes have a decided impact on social and economic policy,
and that this impact is decidedly different from that of civilian regimes. In a
bitter irony, one thing that can be said about these regimes is that they on
average performed no better (and in many cases performed much worse) than
civilian regimes when pursuing developmentalist goals, even when judged by their
own performance standards (Hartlyn and Morley, 1986, esp. Chs.2-3).
Part, of the problem of testing assumptions about the impact of military
regimes on public policy and resource allocation is due to the continued
inability to adequately distinguish between civilian, military, and even
bureaucratic authoritarian regimes. The interpenetration of civilian and
military roles in Latin America is well known, and has consistently made
difficult precise labeling of civilian as opposed to military regimes (Janowitz,
1977; Remmer, 1978; Simon, 1978; Lowenthal and Fitch, 1986; Grindle, 1987).
Similarly, the emphasis on bureaucratic processes of decision-making and
technocratic and efficientist orientations has allowed for the identification of
a number of regimes as "bureaucratic-authoritarian" despite their varying
degrees of militarization. Brazil (1964-1985), Argentina (1966-1973, 1976-
1983), Uruguay (1973-1985), Chile ( 1973-present) , Peru (1968-1980), and even the
PRI regime in Mexico have been included in this category (Collier, 1979; Merkx
and Remmer, 1982). More recently, this label has been attached to regimes
outside of Latin America, including those in South Korea (Im, 1987), Turkey
(Sunar and Sayari, 1986), and Poland (as Przeworski, 1982, implies). Hence,
conceptual imprecision, coupled with the habitual difficulties in obtaining
reliable empirical data, may be the root causes of the inability to achieve
definitive conclusions about, the policy impact of such regimes.
One area in the literature on modern authoritarian regimes upon which there
is relatively little disagreement is the structure of the state under these
types of regime. In early writings, O'Donnell refered to BA states as opposed
to BA regimes (O'Donnell, 1973, 1976, 1977, 1978; 1979), something which was
accepted by some (Sloan, 1981) and critized at length by others (Cardoso, 1979;
Stepan, 1980; Merkx and Remmer, 1982). In his later writings on the subject,
O'Donnell at. least, partially concedes the point, and places more emphasis on the
political, social, and economic objectives of regimes rather than on the
structure of the state itself (O'Donnell, 1982). The important point is that
under a wide variety of authoritarian regimes, and despite their varying
ideological foundations and policy objectives in a range of functional areas,
the state is characterized by the bureaucratic and technocratic orientations
mentioned above. Contrary to democratic states, in which concession and
compromise are major ingredients of the policy-making process, and thus
strongly influence the organization of the state apparatus, these types of state
seriously limit the amount and type of inputs afforded civil society in that
process, something that is manifest, in the organization of the state apparatus.
It is the top-down, elitist, unresponsive, and heavily centralized structure of
these states, in other words, that, distinguishes them from other types of state.
Yet, as we shall see, the extent to which the state achieves organizational
"insulation" varies from authoritarian regime to authoritarian regime, which
adds to the confusion regarding the policy impact of these regime types. It is
here where the issue of relative levels of militarization becomes relevant,
because it is the degree of military control over the state apparatus that
serves as one of the distinguishing characteristics between authoritarian
regimes, something which should have an impact at the level of public policy.
In order to clarify the discussion of regime type so as to better assess
their impact on public policy, we propose to follow Cordoso (1979) and define
military-bureaucratic regimes according to the degree of direct military control
over the state apparatus rather than on their ideological, political, economic
and bureaucratic-technocratic orientations per se. The extent to which control
of the state apparatus under a particular military-bureaucratic regime is
assumed by active duty military personnel—that is, the military as a corpora-
tion— is here considered to reflect a "deepening" of military control that
should be strongly evident at the level of public policy. This relative "depth"
allows us to look beyond civil-military coalitions and procedural incumbents
(government leaders) and into the state—the instrument responsible for for-
mulating and implementing public policy—in order to determine if the regime is
in fact militarized. If theory holds true, the greater the militarization of
the state apparatus, greater should be the difference with respect to the
policies and resource allocation procedures of civilian regimes. While it may
be true that control of the state leads to further politization of the military,
the important point is that as political actors the degree of control over the
state apparatus afforded the military in such instances is far superior to that
of any elected government, something which should be reflected at the level of
policy outputs. More specifically, the depth of militarization of the state
parallels the degree of exclusion from decision-making spheres to which opposi-
tion groups are subjected. The narrower the regime's support base, greater is
the exclusion of other social groups.
Deepening of militarization generally occurs in response to the severity of
the political crisis that precipitated the military's assumption of power
(O'Donnell, 1978). The deeper the previous crisis and the higher the level of
threat perceived by the military hierarchy and its civilian allies, greater is
the exclusion of those groups that the regime holds accountable for the crisis,
or which it believes could threaten the achievement of regime objectives.
Hence, depending on the nature of the preceeding crisis, deeper will be the
degree of militarization in state agencies that are responsible for carrying out
exclusionary policies. This should have a measurable impact on state per-
formance, particularly in policy areas that directly affect perceived opposition
groups. Here we do not assign significant weight to the ideological content of
a specific regime's project, but to policy shifts (measured in budgetary
allocations) that result after it assumes power. Even so, it is necessary to
describe the socioeconomic and political outlook of the regime, as well as the
circumstances of its assumption, in order to understand the background to these
policy shifts. This permits us to avoid the ahistorical determinism that
characterizes much of the empirical literature (See for example Schmidt, 1986).
So as to test the hypothesis that the depth of militarization influences
the policy output of military-bureaucratic regimes, we have selected as subject.s
of study the military regimes that governed Argentina from 1966 to 1973 and 1976
to 1983. For comparative purposes we have included economic data on state
expenditures from 1961 to 1982, with emphasis on the two civilian regimes that
alternated power with them in 1963-1966 and 1973-1976, plus a more long term
budgetary picture in two core areas of state activity. The reasons for this
choice are two-fold. On • one hand, modern Argentina represents an excellent
example of a country beset by chronic political instability and frequent,
irregular, and unpredictable succession between civilian and military regimes,
something that should be empirically evident, in both macro and micro variations
in public policy indicators. On the other hand, the two regimes represent
archtypical case studies of military bureaucratic authoritarianism sequentially
located in the same national context. In fact, the "Revolucion Argentina" of
1966-1973 provided the first study of such a regime type (O'Donnell, 1973,
1982), while the "Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional" of 1976-1983 represents a
refinement of the theme that allows us to test the "deepening" hypothesis within
the same national boundaries (Rouquie, 1983; Oszlak, 1985). Analysis of
macroeconomic and microeconomic indicators in core areas of state activity under
each regime should allow us to diachronically compare data over time and across
civilian and military regime types (to test the validity of the standard
civilian-military dichotomy), and more importantly , to measure the impact
different levels of militarization have on public policy outputs under the two
military regimes. By doing so, we expect to demonstrate not only the validity
of the standard hypothesis, but also that the depth of militarization of the
state apparatus is correlated with variations in certain policy indicators,
specifically budgetary distributions at both the macroeconomic level within the
state (i.e., in the general provision of public goods), and at the microeconomic
level within specific core areas of state activity, in this case national health
and labor administration. We also thereby avoid the methodological difficulties
involved with cross-national comparisons that have plauged the empirical
literature (Remmer, 1978).
II. Military-Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in Argentina, 1966-1973, 1976-1983 .
The "Revolucion Argentina" and the "Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional"
represent successive attempts by the armed forces hierarchy and their civilian
allies to put an end to the cycle of political strife, economic deterioration,
and increased social disorder that had marked Argentina after 1946. To ac-
complish this, both regimes proposed to eliminate Peronism as a political force,
since the levels of working class and lower middle class mobilization prompted
by the emergence of the "Tercera Posicion" (Third Position) was believed to have
contributed to the disruption of traditional Argentine values, social hier-
archies, and modes of collective and individual behavior. The technical justi-
fication for the exclusion of these social groups (as the social bases of
Peronism) was that the national economy needed to be stabilized, the state
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required rationalization, and a perceived subversive threat needed to be ef-
fectively countered. Since this view held that the demagogic policies of the
Peronist regime of 1946-1955 started the cycle of national decay, and since the
succeeding non-Peronist civilian regimes were considered to have been either toe
weak or vacilatory to accomplish the necessary requirements for national
stabilization, it would take a firm hand to deal with these pathologies. Be it
in the form of labor legislation that protected the "vertical" structure of the
Peronist-dominated union movement, be it in the protection of inefficient
domestic industries and state enterprises in which the working and lower classes
were concentrated, or be it the social welfare and related services that had
been used by Peron to cement working class and lower middle class support, all
state-sponsored activities that contributed to the survival of the Peronist
movement needed to be severely curtailed, when not eliminated. With regard to
the last of the areas mentioned above, those state services that could not be
transferred to private hands would per force disappear. In this regard, these
regimes represented extensions—indeed, incremental deepening—of the "Revoluc-
ion Libertadora" that had ousted Juan Peron in 1955. The difference between
them lies in that the "Revolucion Libertadora" was by design a temporary,
caretaker regime whose mission was to "cleanse" the Argentine political system
of the residual Peronist vestiges before returning power to civilian elected
authorities. With the failure of that initial project, the succeeding attempts
at military rule were more extensive, especially in terms of the social objec-
tives underlying economic policy, the long-term commitment to rule (each lasted
seven years in power), and in the systematic way in which the military came to
influence the policy-making process. The three military regimes can thus be
arranged on a continuum of institutionalization ranging from the caretaker role
of the "Revolucion Libertadora" to the ruler roles of the "Revolucion Argentina"
and the "Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional." (O'Donnell, 1978; 1982; Wynia,
1978, 1986). In fact, as we shall see below, incremental militarization went in
hand with increased institutionalization, and was particularly evident in the
composition of the state apparatus under the last two regimes. It is for this
reason that we shall concentrate our attention on the latter, leaving aside for
the moment the effect on public policy brought about by the installation of the
caretaker "Revolucion Libertadora. " As we shall see, there exist some parallels
in the policy approaches of this regime and the regime installed in 1976.
These regimes also represent a continuum of exclusion. The "Revolucion
Libertadora" was most interested in re-drafting the Peronist constitution of
1949 and preventing the leaders of the ousted Peronist regime from returning to
power. The "Revolucion Argentina" attempted to remove and replace the institu-
tional vehicles that had allowed the Peronist movement to survive repeated
purges, electoral exclusion, coercive intimidation, and internal factionalism,
to say nothing of the long-term exile of its namesake (Ranis, 1966). Finally,
the "Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional" represented a c-.mprehensive attempt to
use state terror, economic reforms, and social policy to disrupt the collective
identities of the social groups that were the mainstay of the Peronist movement,
thereby producing conditions of individual regression and isolation that made
the subordinate fractions of Argentine society more easily subject to market
forces in general, and to the dictates of a restorative variant of "liberal"
economic doctrine in particular (which attempted to reimpose the primacy of the
agro-export and transnational sectors over the domestic industrial classes).
Known erroneously as "market fascism," this project represented the maximum (and
darkest) expression of the zero-sum economic and political competition—-the
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"impossible game" described by O'Donnell ( 197 3 ) --that, characterized Argentina
during the postwar era (Buchanan, 1985a; 1987a). As we explain below, the scope
of this last regime's transformation goals was particularly reflected in the
distribution of resources to areas of the state that were directly connected
with the excluded social groups. In each case, the "depth" of exclusion of
opposition groups paralleled increases in the level of militarization in those
areas of the state apparatus
.
That all three projects ultimately failed attests to the enduring strength
of Peronism as a political force, and to the resiliency of civil society when
confronted by the politics of exclusion. What this common failure did not
prevent, though, was the shifts in public policy that went in hand with the
transfer of government authority by coup d'etat and the subsequent militariza-
tion of the state apparatus. In all cases, shifts in policy were accompanied by
shifts in budgetary allocations in certain functional areas of state activity
after the military's entrance in power.
In postwar Argentina, each instance of military rule has signified one
stroke in the cyclic pattern of "pendular" shifts in political alliances that
characterized this period (O'Donnell, 1976; also see Merkx, 1969). Translated
by victorious political alliances into public policy (including the "coup coali-
tions" mentioned by O'Donnell that constituted the initial nucleus of authority
in the military regimes), the ebb and flow of these shifts had the effect of
promoting a tidal process of organizational development within the Argentine
state apparatus, something that was manifest in a seemingly endless series of
bureaucratic reorganizations, reversals, readjustments, and partial reinstate-
ments, in budgetary shifts at the macro-and microeconomic levels, and in
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personnel recruitment and turnover patterns (Buchanan, 1985a; also see Most,
1980)
.
Within the state, these pendular shifts were concretely evident in the
bifrontal and segmental character of state corporatist modes of interest group
administration under the military-bureaucratic regimes (Oszlak and O'Donnell,
1976; O'Donnell, 1977). Inclusionary instruments comprised of state-provided
inducements for cooperation were utilized to facilitate the access of allied
social groups to decision-making positions (as a form of quasi-societal cor-
poratism) , while exclusionary instruments that emphasized state- imposed con-
straints were used to prevent subordinate group interference with the formula-
tion and implementation of public policy (Collier and Collier, 1979; O'Donnell,
1978; O'Donnell, 1979; Oszlak, 1980; also see Stepan, 1985). Thus the "Revclu-
cion Argentina" opened the doors of the economic management branch to the
industrial bourgeoisie (both national and transnational) while the "Proceso de
Reorganizacion Nacional" did the same for the agro-export and transnational
financial elites. Both regimes systematically closed all avenues of institu-
tional access previously afforded the lower middle and working classes (Rouquie,
1982; Waldmann and Garzon Valdez, 1983; Buchanan, 1985a; 1987a). Hence, while
the economic development strategies of the allied social groups can be hypothe-
sized as having a positive effect on the aggregate amount of public resources
directed towards the economic management branch in both cases, the exclusion of
opposition groups should be similarly reflected in a negative distribution of
public resources to those areas of state activity most directly connected with
them, i.e. public goods, especially social services such as health, housing,
social security, welfare, and education, and in state agencies responsible for
interest group articulation (such as national labor administration).
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With regard to the relative degrees of militarization, the three postwar
military regimes represent sequential attempts at deepening the military's
control over the state apparatus. The "Revolucion Libertadora, " as a caretaker
regime, limited militarization to the apex of the state (in this case the
executive branch) , and a few selected agencies where the Peronist presence was
deemed to be particularly heavy (such as the Labor Ministry). The "Revolucion
Argentina" further militarized the apex of the state in the form of the junta of
commanders-in-chief, and designated high-ranking military officers as cabinet
members in defense-related portfolios, as provincial govenors , and in selected
other upper-echelon positions such as ambassadors, executive branch advisors,
and the like. The remainder of the state apparatus, however, continued in the
hands of civilians, although this control was divided between representatives of
allied groups in high-echelon positions and career public servants in all other
posts (as was the case with both labor and health administration). Ultimate
oversight authority was vested in the military leadership of the executive
branch (Grondona, 1967; Niosi, 1974; O'Donnell, 1982). In the case of the
"Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional," the extent of militarization of the upper
and middle echelons of the state appraratus was unprecedented in that it was
virtually complete. "With the exceptions of the Ministry of Economy (entirely
controlled by civilians) and the Ministry of Education (in which the military
shared management positions with like-minded civilians), every major branch of
the state was staffed through the department level with military personnel-
. . .Rank had its priviledges: flag officers (generals and admirals) were awarded
cabinet and subcabinet positions (ministers, secretaries, and undersecretaries),
while upper-rank field grade officers (colonels, commodores, majors, captains)
were assigned positions down to the level of directors of departments" (Buchan-
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an, 1987a, p. 352; also see Oszlak, 1980, and Rouquie, 1982b). The perceived
need for extensive militarizar.ion of the state apparatus was due to the fact
that, like the "Revolucion Libertadora" (and unlike the "Revolucion Argentina,"
which ousted a non-Peronist regime), the "Prcceso de Reorganizacion Nacional"
removed a Peronist regime from power. Given the failures of the previous
authoritarian projects, and the levels of corruption, political strife, and
social anomoly extant under the government of Isabel Peron, the need to remove
Peronist influences from Argentine institutional and social life (both public
and private) required an unprecedented degree of military control over both the
state and society.
The extent of this "deepening" of military control was also evident in
other ways. Control over lead agencies, as well as all provincial govenorships
and many ambassadorships and other high ranking posts , was divided among the
three branches of the armed forces. The army assumed control over the internal
control agencies (including the ministries of Interior and Labor), the navy
assumed control of the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Social Welfare, and the
Air Force supervised the Ministry of Transportation. It is significant to note
that while the army, as the largest service, had a "natural" responsibility for
managing the internal control agencies (especially given the levels of social
strife and political terrorism of the time), the navy was given control of the
social welfare branch, which included the secretaries of Housing, Public Health,
and Social Security. As the most consistenr.ly anti-Peronist of the armed forces
(Potash, 1980; Rouquie, 1982a; Imaz, 1964), this gave the navy the opportunity
to restructure those state agencies that had been given the most emphasis by the
preceeding Peronist regime. Together, this division of functional respon-
sibilities, coupled with the particulars of the regime's socio-economic project
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and the depth to which direct military control extended in the state apparatus,
represented a considerable deepening of militarization with respect to previous
Argentine exercises in non-competitive rule (Buchanan, 1985a, 1987a)
.
Like the "Revolucion Libertadora" and the "Revolucion Argentina," the
"Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional" disbanded the legislature and placed the
judiciary under de facto military supervision. In all three cases an Army
officer was appointed president, since he was the representative of the largest
service. In the latter two cases, the powers of the executive branch were
expanded along with the creation of the junta of commanders-in-chief and during
the last military regime, the presidential term was fixed at a non-renewable
five years in an attempt to institutionalize succession. However, unlike its
predecessors, the "Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional" seriously limited
civilian participation in the decision-making processes, confining them to the
economic management and education/ideological branches. Though not inconsequen-
tial by any means (since the economic branch made all economic policy decisions,
including those affecting the field of labor relations, and controlled all non-
military public enterprises, the Central Bank, and the secretariats of Agricul-
ture, Commerce, Finance, and Industry, while control of the educational system
allowed them to purge curricula of "subversive" influences), such limitations on
civilian control of the state had a strong effect on the process of policy-
formation, since military criteria strongly influenced the full range of policy
concerns.
Under both the "Revolucion Argentina" and the "Proceso de Reorganizacion
Nacional," civilian presence in the state apparatus (including non-military
branches) was inversely porportional to military representation. This had an
interesting effect on the levels of autonomy achieved by different branches of
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the state. In the economic management branch where the civilian presence was
uniformly heavy (albeit selective in terms of social backgrounds), the levels of
autonomy were quite low, since it was in this branch where the civilian allies
of the military hierarchy were concentrated, and where their sectoral economic
objectives were transformed (as a form of theoretical cement that justified the
imposition of authoritarian controls on society) into national economic policy.
In those branches charged with enforcing the exclusion of opposition groups
(such as the ministries of Social Welfare, Interior, and Labor), the degree of
autonomy with respect to those groups was quite high. This was all the more
evident under the "Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional," where all of the
branches responsible for implementing and enforcing exclusionary policies were
placed under military control. Thus, the bifrontal and segmental character of
state corporatism under these regimes had the effect of promoting a similar
bifrontal and segmental pattern of state autonomy, high where exclusionary
responsibilities were paramount, low where inclusionary instruments were
dominant. Under the "Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional" this tendency reached
its highest expression: state autonomy was high where the civilian presence was
least, low where it was greatest (Buchanan, 1987b; Stepan, 1985). We can
therefore hypothesize that the degree of "permeability" of the military-bureau-
cratic state by sectoral interests is inversely porportional to its degree of
militarization
.
What this implies is that, because of its higher level of militarization
and autonomy vis a vis civil society, the "Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional"
had a greater degree of discretion when it came to the budgetary process than
did the "Revolucion Argentina." Contrary to the latter, which had to contend
with civilian factions both within and without the state when it came to
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allocating resources to different, areas of state activity, the "Proceso de
"Reorganizacion Nacional" could allocate resources as it preferred, secure in
the knowledge that the militarized state apparatus would prevent serious
opposition from arising against their budgetary decisions. Hence, the "Proceso
de Reorganizacion Nacional" can be considered to be an example of military-
bureaucratic authoritarianism where military priorities in virtually all policy
areas (save the economic management branch) were paramount, since the degree of
military control of the state apparatus ensured that policy decisions were
insulated from, and did not have to compete with, the demands of civilian
sectors both inside and outside the state. In effect, it was the objective
conditions surrounding their assumption of power, coupled with the lessons
learned from the experience of their military predecessors, plus the complemen-
tary nature of the social and political objectives of the civilian economic
team, that prompted the uniformed architects of the "Proceso de Reorganizacion
Nacional" to extend military control over the state apparatus in order to better
enforce the terms of their joint project of societal reorganization. We can
therefore surmize that social and economic objectives unhindered by sectoral
interference or other forms of concession or compromise with civil society are
what determined the level of budgetary allocations in core policy areas under
this regime. As such, the "Proceso" represents one of the "purer" forms of
militarism recently witnessed in the region, comparable in this respect with the
Pinochet regime in Chile or the Velasco regime in Peru (despite the more
personalistic character of the former and the ideological differences of the
latter) . It was only after the convergence of a worsening economic crisis and a
crisis of presidential succession in 1981 (the "Achilles Heel" of BA regimes
mentioned by O'Donnell) that the regime's ability to disguise its internal
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tensions and insulate itself from the pressures emmanating from civil society
began to visibly wane. At that point the regime attempted to stage a diversion
in order to deflect public attention from its internal problems while at the
same time re-establishing its authority over an increasingly restless popula-
tion. The results of the Malvinas/Falklands adventure—a classic recipie for
authoritarian collapse in the form of involvement in a foreign war resulting in
military defeat—are now well known. (Altamirano, 1982; Mackin, 1983; Pion-
Berlin, 1985).
The point is that for the first five years of its rule, the "Proceso de Re-
organizacion Nacional" exhibited a level of militarization, segmental state
autonomy, and a general insulation from civil society that was unparalleled in
Argentine history, including that seen under the "Revolucion Argentina". All of
these traits had a profound effect on the character and content of public
policy; it is our task to determine if this was reflected in macro- and micro-
economic indicators as well.
Although it would be worth delving at further length into the differences
between the "Revolucion Argentina" and the "Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional,"
this is not the place for such an undertaking. Moreover, since our focus is on
the two institutionalized military-bureaucratic regimes, we do not analyze the
1962-1963 military-backed caretaker government, headed by Jose Maria Guido, nor
do we differentiate between the civilian (elected) regimes. We consequently
avoid discussion of the obvious contrasts between the minority Union Cxvica
Radical government of Arturo Illia (1963-1966) and the populist Peronist
government (1973-1976) beyond generally evaluating the impact each had on public
policy and budgetary allocations in core functional areas. Although inferences
can be drawn from the data we present, at the aggregate level the dividing line
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with emphasis on the latter. Exploration of the differences between the
civilian regimes shall have to wait. Until such a time, the reader is advised
to consult the extensive literature on the subject (e.g. Cavarozzi, 1983;
Historia Politica Argentina, 1985; Wynia, 1978; 1986). For the moment consider
that the two military-bureaucratic regimes examined here promoted different
degrees of militarization in the state apparatus, and hence should evidence
significant differences at the level of public policy. It is to the empirical
analysis of this hypothesis that we now turn.
III. Budgetary Allocations .
Our economic analysis covers two overlapping categories of budgetary data.
The first is aggregate macroeconomic data on central administrative expenditures
for social and military functions from 1961 to 1982, classified by civilian or
military regime type. The longer time frame allows for better consideration of
trends begun before the UCR regime was installed in 1963, which in turn permits
a better evaluation of the subsequent budgetary impact of the military-bureau-
cratic regimes. Non-defense related expenditures are sub-divided into economic
development, social service, and general administration categories. The second
type of budgetary data consists of a linear or longitudinal time series micro-
economic survey of central administrative expenditures on national health and
labor administration for the period 1963-1982, coupled with observations about
the general organizational features displayed by these areas under the military
regimes in question. Besides adding further historical and contextual depth,
this will allow us to directly compare macro- and micro-economic indicators over
time and across regime types in selected core areas of state activity (and in
the case of the military regimes, between them), then relate our findings to the
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the case of the military regimes, between them), then relate our findings to the
relative degree of militarization under the last two military-bureaucratic
regimes. The combination of perspectives is designed to provide the type of
analytic overlap that has often been missing in the empirical literature.
Our reason for choosing these particular core areas of state activity for
microeconomic scrutiny stems from the fact that public health is a universally
recognized public good, while labor administration represents the institutional
nexus in which working class demands and interests are mediated by the state.
One is concerned with administering the interests of a fundamental producer
group, while the other is concerned with providing a basic necessity for human
capital enhancement. More importantly, although labor administration is more
obviously political in character, health administration also reflects the
ongoing status of political conflict under different regimes. Hence, if the
theoretical literature is correct, both areas should evidence tangible differ-
ences between civilian and military regimes. This is especially so in the cases
studied here, since organized labor eventually (although not initially, since
different labor factions favored both corps) represented the largest source of
opposition to both of the military regimes once they were installed, and public
health was considered by both to be one of those areas of state activity that
had been a source of waste and inefficiency under civilian governments. If
theory holds true, budgetary shifts (downward) in both areas should be evident
under the military-bureaucratic regimes, and should be most pronounced under the
"Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional."
We should add two notes of caution, however. The infamous unreliability of
government-provided economic data is especially true for these military regimes,
and should be viewed as a "best face" effort on their part, particularly with
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regard to the macroeconomic data. The microeconcmic survey is designed to
uncover some of the realities that underlie the itiacroeconomic "best face."
Secondly, here we focus on budgetary allocations as policy outputs, as opposed
to systemic performance (policy outcomes). The lag time between policy output
and outcome makes assessment of systemic effects extremely difficult, yet does
not disguise the regime's intent at the moment of output. For the moment we
shall defer consideration of systemic performance. Even so, recent research
suggests that the policies of the heavily militarized "Proceso de Reorganizacion
Nacional" did have a significant negative impact on Argentine society (O'Don-
nell, 1983; Buchanan, 1987a), and that this negative authoritarian legacy
persists to this day (and is in fact a major source of the democratic regime's
current difficulties) (Oszlak, 1984; Critica y Utopia, 1983).
2
A. Macroeconomic Results .
Macroeconomic analysis of the share of central government allocations for
the period 1961-1982 was performed by regressing each of the eight dummy
variables individually on the share of the main budgetary classifications.
These included: point begin; defense; general administration; domestic
security; total social services, including education, health, social security-
welfare, other social expenditures, and housing; and economic development. To
determine the impact on military expenditures of changes in regime type, a
series of dummy variables were created. There is sufficient reason to believe
that regime type does not have the same meaning over time (O'Donnell, 1978),
i.e. the first and second military regimes in fact have few similarities with
regard to economic policy, with the same holding true for the civilian regimes.
The analysis is then repeated for the 1963-1982 time frame. At least eight
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different representations of the 1963-1982 regime types make sense (Table 1; all
tables are located in Appendix A) , with :
1. DUMPB representing the standard civilian/military dichotomy;
2. DUMP depicting structural shifts upwards over time between the 1960's
regimes to the Peronists and finally the second military regime. If DUMP is
statistically significant, the country would have experienced two sharp breaks
upward in the amount of funds allocated to military expenditures during the
1963-1983 period;
3. DUMPA similar to DUMP with three upward structural shifts produced with
regime change, i.e. increased militarization with regime change;
4. DUMPC assuming military regimes in Argentina to allocate significantly
more resources to defense than their civilian counterparts, with the Peronists
more inclined to increase defense expenditures than the UCR regime;
5. DUMPD similar to DUMPC but with the UCR regime more prone to step up
military spending than the Peronists;
6. DUMPE assuming the Peronists least likely to give priority to defense,
followed by the UCR regime, then the first military regime, with the second
military regime most heavily increasing military spending;
7. DUMPF assuming no real change in military allocation priorities in the
1960's, a sharp decline under the Peronist regime, and a major shift upwards
under the second military regime. This interpretation is most often implicitly
assumed in the theoretical literature;
8. DUMPG assuming again that the Peronists are least likely to undertake
military spending, followed by the UCR regime. It is used to test whether the
first military regime was more inclined to allocate funds to defense purposes
than the second military regime.
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The results (Table 2) for the 1963-1982 period indicate that:
1
.
The shift from civilian to military regimes tends to increase the
share of the budget allocated to defense, with the second military regime
marginally inclined to be more prone to raise defense expenditures (the statis-
tically significant DUMPE, but lower value than DUMPD, which assumes the first
and second military regimes to be equally inclined to increase the share of the
budget allocated to defense over that of their civilian predecessors);
2. There has been a secular shift downwards over time in the share of the
budget allocated to general administration (the high statistical significance of
DUMPA )
;
3. Domestic security allocations appear to be insensitive to regime
change (the insignificance of the t value for each political shift variable);
4. The share of allocations going to total social services are reduced on
the assumption of power by the military regimes (the consistently significant
and negative t value for the dummy shift variables), with the second military
regime more inclined to reduce social expenditures than the first (the relative-
ly high t value for DUMPE and DUMPF) . This directly confirms the "deepening"
hypothesis;
5. The budgetary share allocated to education is particularly and
negatively affected by the assumption of power by the military (consistently
significant and negative t value for the dummy political shift variable)
;
education allocations were especially vulnerable during the "Proceso de Re-
organizacion Nacional" (the high significance of DUMPF);
6. The share of the budget allocated to health does not appear to be
significantly affected by regime type;
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7. The share of the budget, allocated to social security and welfare seems
to increase secularly over time and is not related to civilian-military regime
types (the statistical significance of DUMPA and insignificance of the other
dummy shift variables);
8. The share of the budget allocated to other social expenditures is
reduced by both military regimes, with the second military regime's reductions
being greater (the statistical significance of DUMPF ),-
9. The share of the budget allocated to housing is also reduced by the
military regimes, with the second military regime having the larger (negative)
impact (the higher significance of DUMPE and DUMPF expanded with DUMPD). This
supports findings reported elsewhere (e.g. Yugncvsky, 1985);
10. Economic development allocations have decreased secularly as a share
of the budget (the high negative t values for DUMP and DUMPA). There is some
evidence that the military regimes have been inclined to increase allocations to
this area over those likely to have been made by the civilian regimes (the
positive and significant t values for DUMPD, DUMPE, DUMPF, and DUMPG).
Analysis of the impact of military and civilian regimes on the share of
major budgetary allocations indicates that the thesis that military regimes
appear inclined to increase defense expenditures and economic development
allocations at the expense of social expenditures holds quite consistently for
modern Argentina. Less uniformly but still significantly, the results also
confirm the "deepening" hypothesis advanced here. As with the analysis of
regime type and the level and share of military expenditure, a comparison of the
1961-1975 and 1966-1982 sub-periods provides additional insights into the shift
in national priorities that followed the change from civilian to military
regimes in Argentina.
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A comparison of the results by budgetary category for the extended time
3frame (Tables 3-4) indicate that:
1. In both sub-periods, there was a general shift towards the share of
central government budgets allocated to defense when regimes changed from
civilian to military. For the 1961-1975 period, the greatest shift occurred
(downward) when the Peronists assumed power (DUMPF), with no distinction made
between the UCR regime and the "Revolucion Argentina." The results for the
second (1966-1982) time period largely confirm those obtained for the 1961-1982
period as a whole (Table 4). The share of funds allocated to defense increase
with the ascent of the military regimes. However, there appears to be little
difference between the two regimes in their inclination to increase the share of
the defense budget (statistical significance of DUMPC, DUMPB, DUMPD greater than
DUMPE, DUMPF, or DUMPG ) . Increased use of repression as an instrument of policy
by the "Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional," it seems, did not require increases
in budgetary outlays to defense, just a more directed use of available resources
(as we shall see in our microeconoraic analysis of labor administration).
2. When looking at the 1966-1982 period, the share of the budget allo-
cated to public administration generally follows the secular decline observed
for the period as a whole (with DUMP and DUMPA highly significant) . The second
military regime also seems more inclined to reduce this expenditure than the
first military regime, and certainly more inclined to do so than the Peronists
(statistical significance of DUMPF). The 1961-1975 period, however, showed no
real shift in the share of allocations to general administration after a change
of regime.
3. Again, as with the period as a whole, the share of the budgetary
resources allocated to domestic security was not affected by regime change in
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either sub-period, paralleling the findings with regards to defense expendi-
tures.
4. The share of the budget allocated to total social services was reduced
by the military regimes in the second period, with the "Proceso de Reorganiza-
cion Nacional" evidencing a greater shift in resources away from this category.
The only statistically significant dummy variable for the first time period was
DUMPF, where the first civilian regime and the first military regime are treated
as equal.
5. The general pattern for total social services is confused for educa-
tion, with the second time period showing a consistently strong inclination by
the second military regime to reduce allocations to this area. In the first
time period, non-statistically significant shifts in funds allocated to educa-
tion occurred after the regime changes. The importance of this stems from the
fact that the education branch was staffed by civilians under both military
regimes. This contradictory evidence of the relationship between relative
militarization and policy output is mitigated somewhat by the presence of
military personnel in the Education Ministry (recall that they shared upper-
echelon positions with like-minded civilians) during the "Proceso de Reorgani-
zacion Nacional," which had the most marked drop in expenditures in this area
(which more than likely stemmed from the regime's attempts to purge the educa-
tional system of purported subversive influences).
6. The first time period depicts a marked shift downwards in health
expenditures when the Peronists assumed office, but little change between the
UCR regime and the "Revolucion Argentina." The 1966-1982 time period simply
depicts the secular reduction in funds allocated to health with no real distinc-
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tion between civilian and military regimes. As we shall see, this is con-
tradicted by the micro-economic analysis.
7. As for the period as a whole, neither sab-period experienced any
pattern of change in social security and welfare allocations that can be
correlated with regime changes.
8. Other social expenditures went up sharply with the Peronists in the
first time period, with little distiction, however, found between the first
civilian and first military regimes. There was a slight inclination in the
second time period for the second military regime to cut budget allocations to
this category.
9. Housing was severely cut by the "Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional"
(DUMPE, Table 4; also see Yugnovsky, 1985), while the Peronists increased
housing expenditures sharply. No such distinction was found between the UCR
regime and the "Revolucion Argentina" (a slight difference is present as
indicated by DUMPD, DUMPE, and DUMPG in Table 3).
10. With regard to economic development, the second time period indicates
that the second military regime was more willing to allocate funds for this
activity than the first military regime, and very much more so than the Peron-
ists (DUMPF in Table 3). There was, however, a fairly strong downward trend
(DUMP) during this time period. The first sub-period again saw little distinc-
tion between the civilian and military regimes, with the Peronists very inclined
to use funds for purposes other than economic development.
The major results from the analysis of the sub-periods are:
1. In general, military regimes are much more inclined to shift resources
to defense than are their civilian counterparts, with little distinction between
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the first and second military regimes. The Peronists were less inclined to
spend on defense than the UCR regime.
2. Military regimes in modern Argentina are, in general, more likely to
reduce social expenditures than are their civilian counterparts, although the
major cuts appear to be selective, focusing on education and housing rather than
on health or social security and welfare. Such reductions appear less selective
and more significant under the "Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional."
3. Military regimes have an inclination to increase economic development
expenditures over that allocated by civilian regimes, attesting to the non-
competitive and insulated mature economic policy making under them.
4. For a number of budgetary areas—total social services, health, other
social expenditures, housing and economic development—there was little change
in allocations between the UCR regime and the "Revolucion Argentina."
5. The first military regime appears to be less inclined to reduce social
expenditures (presumably in order to shift them to defense) than the second
military regime, and there is little distinction in this area between the UCR
regime and the "Revolucion Argentina."
6. Overall, the hypothesized shifts are logically confirmed even though
the civilian-military dichotomy generally has a stronger correlation than the
"deepening" variables. But then, it seems intuitively obvious that policy
differences between civilian and military regimes be greater than those between
similarly-oriented military regimes. The point is that policy differences
expressed in macroeconomic indicators between civilian and military regimes are
greater the deeper the level of militarization of the state apparatus.
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B. Microeconomic Results; Expenditures for National Health and Labor Ad-
. . . 4
ministration .
1. Labor Administration.
a. The "Revolucion Argentina," 1966-1973.
Under the "Revolucion Argentina," the Labor Secretariat (which was demoted
from its cabinet-level status and incorporated as a sub-cabinet agency in the
Ministry of Social Welfare, in a tangible manifestation of the military regime's
basic perspective on labor relations) was classified as part of general ad-
ministration in 1966 and 1967, a carry-over from the previous regime. Under the
preceeding civilian regime, national labor administration averaged 0.25 percent
of the central administrative budget, and ranked fifth out of eight ministries
in total allocations (Buchanan, 1985a, p. 245). In 1968 the Labor Secretariat
was re-classified as part of the economic development branch, where it remained
until after the second Peronist regime was installed in 1973. As part of the
economic development branch, national labor administration never received more
than 0.5 percent of the total allocated to that area (which included all
agencies controlled by the Ministry of Economy, plus several semi-autonomous
agencies and state enterprises). Since this sector was only the third largest
employer of central administrative personnel, and since personnel outlays
consumed the largest part of the central administrative budget ( Presupuesto
General de la Nacion , 1966; Folleto de Divulgacion , 1971), it seems clear that
national labor administration was financially and politically a low priority for
the "Revolucion Argentina." In fact, of the Secretariats under the jurisdiction
of the Ministry of Economy after 1968, the Labor Secretariat and its dependen-
cies consistently ranked fifth or sixth of seven such agencies in allocations
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received. As a percentage of the central administrative budget, this diminished
priority was even more evident,
with the Labor Secretariat's share falling from 0.22 percent in 1966 to just
0.01 in 1970 (Buchanan, 1985a; p. 249; Buchanan, 1985b).
As for the distribution of funds within the Labor Secretariat, the growing
importance given to administrative, inspection, and research-related functions
was paralleled by reductions in agencies charged with labor oversight respon-
sibilities. This organizational emphasis on the internal as opposed to external
responsibilities accentuated a trend also begun by the preceeding civilian
regimes. By 1970, the two agencies that provided the main points of contact
with organized labor--the National Directorate of Professional Relations and the
National Directorate of Labor Relations—together received less than either the
National Directorate of Human Resources (which had research and statistic-
gathering responsibilities) or the Secretary's office (which was mainly con-
cerned with internal administrative responsibilities, since labor policy was
formulated in the civilian elite-controlled Ministry of Economics). Their
individual budgets exceeded only that of the National Directorate of Legal
Affairs, an agency with less than half as many employees and considerably fewer
obligations.
The continued downgrading of welfare responsibilities provided by national
labor administration is amply evident in the Labor Secretariat budgets for the
period. In 1966 and 1967 welfare agencies received 0.23 of the Labor Secretari-
at's budget. As of 1968 they were no longer included as a category within the
Secretariat, having been transferred to the Social Welfare Ministry ( Presupuesto
General de la Nacion
, for the years cited) . All of this indicates that on a
financial as well as organizational level, the "Revolucion Argentina" was
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accelerating the process of downgrading and altering the basic orientation of
national labor administration.
Not content with previous attempts to impose tighter accounting procedures
over allocations to labor administration, the "Revolucion Argentina" imposed a
series of more rigorous accounting standards. Non-personnel outlays were
explicitly documented in the secretariat's budget, and generally covered capital
investments in infrastructural necessities such as equipment and office sup-
plies, as well as other items like accident indemnities, etc. As of 1969,
directorates, as lead agencies in their respective functional areas, became
responsible for administering their own non-personnel allocations, reversing the
policy of administering these outlays through one general fund established by
the Frondizi limited democratic administration in 1959. This rearrangement
supports the view that a decentralizing trend was at work within the Labor
Secretariat at the time. Given this, it is not surprising that non-personnel
outlays within the Labor Secretariat were highest in those agencies that had
substantial material requirements for performance of their respective tasks,
particularly those with administration and inspection responsibilities.
The overall financial picture of national labor administration under the
"Revolucion Argentina" complements its organizational demotion. On a general
level, it received very low priority within the regime's economic program, where
it was placed after being stripped of its welfare responsibilities (under the
UCR regime it had operated as the Ministry of Labor and Social Security).
Within the Labor Secretariat, the decentralizing and compartmentalizing trend
was paralleled by decreased budgetary outlays for the agencies involved (in
marked contrast to the budgetary increases awarded the economic policy branch in
general), with financial emphasis placed on more "neutral" internal functions
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such as administration, inspection, and research, while outlays to more "politi-
cal" external agencies such as those responsible for labor relations and
professional associations were reduced considerably. Salary and other person-
nel-related outlays occupied most of the budget for all agencies, and the ratio
of personnel to non-personnel expenses remained constant for the entire period.
After the first president of the "Revolucion Argentina," General Juan
Carlos Ongania, was removed in 1970, the regime embarked on a gradual liberali-
zation leading to its voluntary withdrawal from power and Peronist electoral
victory in 1973. The only significant shift in budgetary allocations to
national labor administration followed its re-elevation to cabinet status in
1971. External, labor-related tasks such as union registration, mediation, and
arbitration came to occupy an increased share of labor administration's atten-
tion as the date established for the devolution of power drew closer, and
consequently began to receive a larger portion of the outlays (especially
personnel-related outlays) awarded to labor administration. Even so, this re-
orientation was not reflected at the level of overall expenditures, where labor
administration continued to receive an average of 0.5 percent of the funds
designated for the economic development branch, and just 0.17 percent of the
central administrative budget. In fact, with its initial demotion and stripping
of welfare responsibilities, the outlays to national labor administration under
the "Revolucion Argentina" were the lowest of the postwar period (Buchanan,
1985a, pp. 247-256; Buchanan, 1985b; also see Chart 1 in Appendix B). In terms
of our concerns, it should be noted that here labor administration was managed
by civilians, specifically career civil servants who implemented policy direc-
tives that were passed down by the civilian regime elites who controlled the
Ministry of Economy. In a sense, the accentuation of internal organizational
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trends started by the preceeding civilian regime was designed to ease the
process of implementing the regime's exclusionary labor policies. (Buchanan,
1985b).
b. The "Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional," 1976-1983.
In many respects, the military-bureaucratic regime installed on March 24,
1976 opted to continue the tidal pattern of organizational change within the
state apparatus by repeating the approach of the "Revolucion Libertadora"
towards national labor administration. Besides the obvious fact that they both
deposed Peronist regimes, both of these military regimes had similar "external"
perspectives on the labor "problem. " As in the case of the "Revolucion Argen-
tina," both regimes outlawed and banned the political and economic activities of
virtually all labor organizations, confiscated union funds and property, altered
the law of professional associations in order to break the "vertical" structure
of the Peronist-dominated union movement, prohibited the right to strike, and
systematically used military interventors and coercion to surpress overt dissent
within the labor movement. In this respect they increased the salience of these
exclusionary measures when compared with the "Revolucion Argentina," to say
nothing of the civilian regimes. This was also the case with respect to budge-
tary allocations. As with the "Revolucion Libertadora," the "Proceso de
Reorganizacion Nacional" did not alter the classification of national labor
administration within the central administrative budget, leaving it in the
social welfare category where it had been placed by the preceeding Peronist
regime. However, unlike the rest of the social welfare branch, which was under
the jurisdiction of the Navy-controlled Ministry of Social Welfare, labor
administration retained organizational autonomy in the form of the army-con-
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trolled Ministry of Labor. The more overt control role required Army occupation
of organized labor's institutional referent, and gave it a special place within
the "social welfare" allocation category (see Buchanan, 1985a). Since the
division of labor established at the onset of the "Proceso" allowed the civili-
an-led Ministry of Economy to formulate the budget for all non-defense agencies
within reductionist parameters anyway (the military having been awarded expanded
budgetary prerogatives in all defense-related agencies), there were less inter-
military conflicts over the allocation of outlays to the social welfare bud-
getary category, despite the overlap of Army and Navy "jurisdictional" responsi-
bilities.
Like the "Revolucion Libertadora" , the "Proceso" did substantially reduce
the overall amount of allocations to the welfare sector in general, including
national labor administration. In 1976 the Labor Ministry and its affiliated
agencies received 0.17 percent of the central administrative budget (similar to
the percentage seen under the "Revolucion Argentina" but down from an average of
0.45 percent under the Peronist regime), rising to 0.30 by 1980 before falling
to 0.2 percent in 1982 ( Presupesto General de la Naci5n , for the years cited;
also see Chart 1 in Appendix B). As was the case with the "Revolucion Liber-
tadora," this was essentially half of the amount delegated to national labor
administration under the preceeding Peronist regime (Buchanan, 1985a).
Within the Labor Ministry, the distribution of allocations remained much
the same as before, although at the generally lower levels prompted by the
general reduction in funds to labor administration as a whole. Many functions,
especially those of regional labor delegations, were removed from the budget and
turned over to provincial authorities, much as had been the case under the
"Revolucion Libertadora." Outlays to labor-related agencies continued to absorb
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most of the budget allocated to centralized agencies, since it was here where
the military presence was felt greatest, and where the regime's constraints on
union activities were enforced with funds channeled to union interventors. In
fact, the small but steady rise of the budget allocated to national labor
administration during this period may be attributed to its heavy level of
militarization (as a leading control agency) and a re-emphasis on the coercive
features of the regime's exclusionary labor policies. Thus, within the general-
ly lower budgetary parameters established for the social welfare branch, labor
administration could enjoy a small upward trend in allocations due to the
reinforced use of its coercive obligations.
Returning to a trend that had been reversed by the Peronist regime,
accounting procedures for non-personnel outlays were ostensibly tightened, which
reduced the amount of these outlays within the Ministry of Labor budget. Unlike
other agencies in the social welfare budgetary category, labor administration
did not have formal benefit distribution responsibilities, other than the
"expertise" of its employees in the field of labor relations. However, under
the war-like perspective of the "Proceso," organized labor was viewed as a major
enemy rather than a client, and expertise was replaced by institutionally
enforced exclusion. Even so, the whole-scale intervention of unions allowed the
army to gain control over union treasuries, property, and other assets (es-
pecially the "Obras Sociales" union health and welfare services). The highly
discretionary use of these assets allowed the army to reduce non-personnel
outlays without losing any of the material benefits they otherwise would have
forsaken. In fact, the indulgence of creature comforts was increased exponen-
tially along with union intervention, since what had once been a bastion of
Peronist corruption became the province of army officers (and infantry officers
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in particular) (Buchanan, 1985a) . Personnel costs therefore continued to occupy
the majority of official outlays throughout national labor administration.
Along with a change in "expertise," the purge of Peronist personnel and their
replacement by military officers helped increase personnel outlays to labor
administration, since civil service scales were replaced by military pay scales.
This magnified the effects of the slight increase in funds allotted to labor
administration throughout the period, since there was an overall reduction of
personnel employed in this area relative to the previous regime (Buchanan,
1985a). The point is that, while labor administration did not suffer the
hypothesized budgetary reductions as a consequence of the "deepening" of
military control over it, the distribution and use of funds, to say nothing of
the character of activities supported by these funds, changed drastically.
Intensified labor repression and military corruption here combined to belie our
"deepening" thesis, since labor administration offered an institutional vehicle
that allowed for the simultaneous satisfaction of the individual (material) and
corporate (political) goals of the military officers that staffed it.
Overall, the financial picture within national labor administration under
the "Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional" more closely resembles that of the
provisional military regime of 1955-1958 rather than the regime that ruled from
1966 to 1973. This is not surprising given that national labor administration
was heavily militarized under both the "Revolucion Libertadora" and the "Proceso
de Reorganizacion Nacional," while it was not under the "Revolucion Argentina."
In the case of the "Revolucion Libertadora" it was one of the few core areas of
state activity so militarized (since it had become an institutional bastion of
the first Peronist regime and needed to be thoroughly "cleansed"). In the case
of the "Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional" it was simply one manifestation of
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the larger militarization of the entire state apparatus that was part of a
systematic project of societal transformation. It seems clear that its highly
sensitive position as the primary institutional link with organized labor made
it appear especially appropriate for militarization in each case, given the
economic, political, and social objectives of both regimes, and the level of
crisis that preceeded their advent to power.
One important fact that emerges from this examination is the inadequacy of
macroana lytic approaches when evaluating regime approaches towards this type of
core state activity. This is because labor administration is consistently
hidden in the "general administration" or "social services-other" budgetary
categories (areas in which very little and statistically insignificant changes
were observed for all regimes), and receives a very small percentage of the
allocations to either category in all cases. Hence, the elimination of labor-
related welfare services from labor administration in 1968 and the coercive re-
emphasis of its regulatory powers (especially the powers of direct intervention
in unions) in 1976, to say nothing of the elimination of many neutral internal
administrative tasks, the substitution of military/or civilial pay scales, and
the discretionary use of confiscated union assets to bolster official budgetary
outlays under the latter military regime, cannot be adequately explained by
using a macroeconomic focus. Only by coupling it with a microeconomic approach
can we begin to discern the subtle budgetary changes that complement the more
visible non-allocative changes that characterized each of these regime's
"external" approach towards labor relations.
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2. National Health Administration.
a. The "Revolucion Argentina", 1966-197 3.
Central administrative outlays to health administration under the "Revolu-
cion Argentina" did not vary significantly with respect to the UCR regime,
averaging 2.5 percent for the first four years (during the Ongania presidency),
then dropping to an average of 1.3 percent during the period 1971-1973 (Buchan-
an, 1985a, pp. 424-425; also see Chart 2 in Appendix B). Health administra-
tion did lose its cabinet status, as it was demoted to a Secretariat in the
Ministry of Social Welfare (one of five such "superagencies" under the regime's
original organizational scheme). More importantly, the vast majority of primary
care centers previously operated in the provinces by national health administra-
tion were transferred to provincial authority. Thus, while central administra-
tive expenditures were reduced only slightly, the overall level of primary care
in the nation's interior dropped significantly (since the climate of fiscal
constraint of the time made it impossible for the provincial governments to
fully pick up the costs of the transferred centers). Personnel-related outlays
continued to consume the largest share of the budget, growing from 63 to 77
percent of central administrative outlays destined for health administration
during this period. Despite the transfer program, agencies with medical atten-
tion responsibilities received the largest share of these outlays, followed by
those responsible for disease erradication and health education programs in the
provinces. The regime's decentralizing efforts were especially felt as of 1971,
and the percentage of outlays directed to health administration within the
social welfare ministry declined from 52 to 33 percent b^ 1973. In fact, by
that year outlays to decentralized and provincial agencies surpassed that of the
centralized health agencies, in a dramatic reversal of the traditional distribu-
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tion of the national health budget. The point is that this occurred within the
lower allocation levels exhibited by health administration as a whole during the
entire period in which the "Revolucion Argentina" held power. By 1973 the total
amount spent on public health in Argentina had dropped to less than 1 percent of
the national budget (Leichter, 1979, p. 78). This occurred in an area that
remained under civilian control. Thus the relative levels of budgetary con-
tinuity with respect to the UCR regime can be attributed to the presence of
these civilians, while the decentralizing program and its negative consequences
can be viewed as the way in which military criteria for state rationalization
came to influence this particular core area of state activity. More important-
ly, unlike labor administration, where the compartmentalizing and decentralizing
trend occurred within centralized labor agencies, here the decentralizing
program removed a variety of services from the purview of centralized health
authorities, and placed them under the jurisdiction of provincial governments
that often lacked the financial capacity to absorb the additional costs these
services entailed. In both cases, the justification given for the decentraliz-
ing trend was based on technical rather than political rationales, although the
political content of these moves should be obvious.
b. The "Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional."
Relative to the Peronist regime of 1973-1976, allocations destined for
national health administration decreased markedly during the "Proceso de
Reorganizacion Nacional," falling from 7.7 percent of the national budget in
1976 (which was formulated by the Peronist regime) to 2.0 percent in 1981.
(Belmartino, Bloch, and de Quinteros, 1981; Bello, 1983; Gonzalez, 1983). As a
percentage of central administrative outlays, the decrease was also dramatic,
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falling from 5.4 percent in 1976 to 0.6 percent in 1981 ( Presupuesto General de
la Nacion , for the years cited; also see Chart 2 in Appendix B) . Beyond the
militarization of the public health apparatus, the distribution of funds within
health administration continued much as before, with emphasis accorded personnel
outlays in primary care and disease control and prevention agencies. Even so,
the lack of significance at the macroeconomic level is contradicted by the total
distribution of funds to public health under the "Proceso de Reorganizacion
Nacional." The dramatic reductions of outlays to health-related areas not
operated by centralized health administration (for example, subsidies for
university hospitals, laboratories, and care facilities operated by the Ministry
of Education and provincial health programs) contributed to a remarkable decline
in overall levels of medical care, and contributed to the downturn in health-
related statistics during this period (Belmartino, Bloch, and de Quinteros,
1981? Bello, 1983; Bermann and Escudero, 1978; Llovet, 1983; Gonzalez, 1983)»
The regime also eliminated the National Integrated Health System instituted by
the Peronist regime, which was designed to ensure adequate medical coverage for
the entire population by assigning at least 5. 1 percent of the national budget
to public health (Buchanan, 1985a; 1987a). In fact, the institution of that
national health program also explains the apparent drop in central administra-
tive expenditures evident at the macroeconomic level under the Peronist regime.
This is because that program re-oriented the majority of funds allocated to
public health through decentralized agencies (especially in the provinces), and
required third party (employer and employee) contributions to the national
health fund. Thus, while central administrative expenditures may well have
experienced a drop in allocations (in constant terms) as the macroeconomic
analysis suggests, the reality was that state expenditures on public health
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actually increased markedly under the second Peronist regime. One only needs to
consider the social bases and political platform of the Peronists to understand
why this was so.
In any event, public health was an area of state activity where the
"privatization" campaign advocated by the "Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional"
was particularly felt, as many of the eliminated health (and welfare) services
were turned over to profit-oriented private concerns. As a result, the total
number of beds provided by public hospitals declined by more than 25 percent
during this period (Belmartino, Bloch, and de Quinteros, 1981; Bello, 1983).
Here again, military control of the union-operated social health and welfare
network was also evident, as many of these faciltiies were closed outright,
thereby excluding unionists and their dependents from their traditional forms of
coverage. Coupled with the "privatization" campaign, this effectively excluded
a large portion of the subordinate classes from medical coverage.
Throughout this period, national health administration was entirely under
the control of the Argentine navy, with some army participation evident in
certain areas such as tropical disease erradication programs (especially in
northern border zones). It should be recalled that the Navy controlled the
Ministry of Social Welfare, under which virtually all social service agencies
were grouped (including not only health administration but also the National
Housing Bank, the primary public housing agency, which we have seen was an area
that suffered severe reductions under the "Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional").
The drastic cuts in budgetary allocations in these areas can thus be seen as a
direct reflection of this control, as opposed to the relative continuity
displayed by health and housing administration under the "Revolucion Argentina"
(Yugnovsky, 1985; Buchanan, 1985a). In any case, public health policy under
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the "Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional" also differed from that of the "Revolu-
cion Libertadora, " which did not militarize health administration, and which
continued the technical emphasis on primary care and disease control functions
that had been the mainstay of the first Peronist regime. It would seem that the
"Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional"' s social objectives, and specifically the
social objectives of the traditionally anti-Peronist Navy, are what brought
about the drastic curtailment in allocations to public health. Though the
negative consequences remained disguised at the macroeconomic level of aggregate
central administrative expenditures (since the cuts in central administrative
expenditures on health were not statistically significant), they are amply
evident at the microeconomic level once decentralized administrative expendi-
tures, and third party contributions are factored in. Hence the militarization
hypothesis, rather than be contradicted or disproved by the macroeconomic data,
is confimed by a closer reading that brings the full range of the regime's
intentions into broader context. Specifically, the increased "depth" of the
regime's social transformation project was paralleled by the depth of militari-
zation of national health administration, and by the extent of budgetary
reductions effected by the regime in this core functional area. Suffice to say
that the "Proceso de Reorganizacion Nacional" reduced total budgetary alloca-
tions for public health to the lowest levels seen in the postwar years (Gon-
zalez, 1983; Buchanan, 1985a).
IV. Conclusion.
While it is true that Argentine militarism is in many respects sui generis,
(e.g. in its adoption of a particular social project and specific relationship
with different civilian sectors) it is also true that it provides a good example
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of the budgetary impact of incremental militarization in the state apparatus.
The same can be said for the discriminating analysis of selected core areas of
state activity, which if not a comprehensive overview, allows us to examine
areas of state activity that occupy the attention of virtually all regimes.
Using a hybrid model that overlaps aggregate macroeconomic data with a lon-
gitudinal microeconomic survey, we have diachronically analyzed the policy
impact of two military-bureaucratic regimes that promoted different levels of
militarization in the same national state apparatus. From our examination we
conclude that, certain variations and apparent contradictions notwithstanding,
what has long been intuitively obvious is in this instance empirically correct.
While the correlation is neither universal nor uniformly strong, and though
certain apparent contradictions between the macro and micro budgetary levels
require contextual explanation, statistical regression of macroeconomic vari-
ables nonetheless demonstrates the general budgetary shifts that follow the
military's assumption of power, and that these shifts are more significant when
(and where) the "depth" of military control over the state apparatus is greater.
Longitudinal analysis of microeconomic variables demonstrates the specific (in
this case negative) impact military regimes have on specific core areas of state
activity that are directly connected with subordinate social groups, even though
these policy areas differ significantly. Both political (labor administration)
and non-political (health administration) branches of the state apparatus
reflected significant changes in policy orientation under the military regimes
that were evident in budgetary allocations to each, although in different ways.
For example, some of these shifts were disguised at the macroeconomic level and
appear to contradict our "deepening" hypothesis. We nevertheless conclude that
recent Argentine military regimes have had a significant impact on public
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policy, particularly in functional areas that directly affect excluded social
groups. This impact is different from that of civilian regimes, and is most
acutely felt when the state apparatus (or at least relevant branches) has been
placed under direct military control. However, the apparent contradictions and
variances serve to underscore the importance of combining macro and micro
analyses in order to account for contextual factors, regime learning processes,
and the general complexities involved in any attempt at regime type-casting. It
is specific socio-economic, ideological, and political objectives that condition
the organizational manifestation of individual military-bureaucratic projects,
something which in turn derives from the particular cicumstances leading up to
and surrounding their assumption of power. This serves to underscore the
importance of relative militarization as an explanatory variable for policy
shifts, since in this case successive military-bureaucratic regimes with
basically similar objectives learned from the failures and successes of their
predecessors, and responded by sequentially coupling incremental militarization
and institutionalization of their rule with more systematic approaches to public
policy making. This had the effect of successively deepening the policy impact
that followed the change from civilian to military regimes.
Pinochet's Chile, Velasco's Peru, and the Uruguayan military-bureaucratic
regime of 1973-1985 seem obvious cases for comparison, although the verdict
remains out on the question as to whether these results can be replicated cross-
nationally. The basic point of this examination, however, has been to use two
of the "purer" forms of militarism recently seen in Latin America in order to
establish the validity of certain basic assumptions regarding the policy impact
of military-bureaucratic regimes. Having moved to do so, we can now engage in
the type of comparative analysis that should better explain policy differences
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(or the lack thereof) based on the relative "depth" of militarization of the
state apparatus exhibited by military regimes elsewhere. At a minimum, we have
added another intervening variable to the debate on the policy impact of
military regimes that, rather than increase confusion, is designed to simplify
explanations about what remains an exceedingly complex issue.
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ENDNOTES
1. The literature on civil-military relations and the impact of military
regimes is too extensive to cite in its totality. By way of an overview,
see Remmer (1978), Most (1980), Grindle (1987), Sloan (1986), Hughes and
Mijeski (1984), Hartyln and Morely (1986), and the sources cited therin.
2. Macroeconomic results refer to budgetary analysis of the impact of regime
type on central administrative expenditures only, and do not take into
account the impact of other independent variables such as international
market conditions, natural disasters, etc. Since our analysis concentrates
on the distribution of the budgetary pie rather than on its total size, and
while we recognize that contracting budgets force some hard distributional
choices upon policy-makers, we believe that inclusion of such additional
variables would unnecessarily complicate and dilute our findings. We
obviously recognize the inherent limitations of our analysis.
3. Tables 3 and 4 contain the same dummy variables offered in Table 1 with the
exception that the 1962 Guido caretaker regime is reclassified as a
civilian rather than a military regime. This was done not so much in
recognition of the hetereogeneous composition of that regime but in order
to test the sensitivity of the data to such shifts and to determine how
stable the pattern of budgetary distributions was over time. The reclas-
sification produced no statistically significant alterations in our
results.
4. All data in this section is taken from the Presupuesto General de la Nacion
for the years cited. References in the text refer to specific years.
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Argentina: Political Dummy Variables, 1961-1982
Weight of Civilian-Military Regimes
Year Dump DumpA DumpB DumpC DumpD DumpE DumpF DumpG
1961 1 1 1
1962 1 1 2 2 2 3
1963 1 1 1
1964 1 1 1
1965 1 1 1
1966 2 2 2 2 3
1967 2 2 2 2 3
1968 2 2 2 2 3
1969 2 2 2 2 3
1970 2 2 2 2 3
1971 2 2 2 2 3
1972 2 2 2 2 3
1973 1 3 1
1974 1 3 1
1975 1 3 1
1976 2 4 2 2 3 2 2
1977 2 4 2 2 3 2 2
1978 2 4 2 2 3 2 2
1979 2 4 2 2 3 2 2
1980 2 4 2 2 3 2 2
1981 2 4 2 2 3 2 2
1982 2 4 2 2 3 2 2





Regime tenures rounded out to start of year for statistical purposes.
Source for data on central administrative expenditures: World Bank, Argentina
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